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1HE SAFETY Al'ID ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
by 
Raymond E. Schweikart 
ABSTRACT 
I The nuclear power plant has given n~ direc~ion to power genera-
tion.) It offers a new source of heat. ·~ The heat can now come from the 
fission of atomic fuel and not from the burning of fossil fuel. 
Safety and protection from the possible hazards of radioactivity 
generated by nuclear power plants is a completely new and untested area. 
-1 I 
. ~~ 
-
Emergency systems and over-desigqed E nstruction are only part of what 
~- • • _A./. 
. ~ 0~ has to be done to make absolutely
1 
c~Ttain such accidents if they occur, 
will be contained allowing no· harmful radioacti~ity to r each the environ-
ment. ( Handling of radioactive wastes is very critical in ;a nuclear power 
. plant. These wastes have to be storaged in protective containers and 
transported to predetermined storage sites. At these sites the containers 
· of radioactive wastes are lowered into large salt mines. 
Licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants during construc-
tion and operation is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
TI1e five member federal panel has issued strict requirements that must be 
met in each step in the process of obtain·ing perrni ts and licenses, con-
struction, and generation. 
ifftd_~;:m nti&e£-rv-
Waldron M. ~Leilon, PhD, P.E. 
Committee Chairman 
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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research report is to collect and present 
a summary of readily available data that will be helpful in informing 
on safety and environmental effects that nuclear power plants will have 
on man and his environment. A second purpose is to create an awareness 
of the great need for nuclear power in the 21st century. This report 
1s the result of a great desire, on the part of the writer, to learn 
as much as possible about present and future positions of nuclear power 
plants and how they will co-exist in and arourid the community of today 
and tomorrow. 
Scope 
The research of this report was largely conducted through an 
extensive library search of books, magazines, and newspapers. Inforrna-
tion was obtained from the Atomic Energy Commission, educational papers 
of environmental nature and from construction contractors. Much litera-
ture was found concerning the safety of nuclear power pl~ts from the 
standpoint of a major accident and from the future effects of stored 
radioactive waste materials. 
This report includes an overview of nuclear power plants power 
, 
generation and their important role in this country's future. This re-
port also includes technical information relating to ·nuclear power 
plant construction, operation and handling of radioactive materials, 
and transportation and storage of radioactive wastes. Finally, conclu-
sions are submitted based on the findings for further research and 
s~. 
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NUCLEAR POWER 
Nuclear Power - General 
r The subject of t~j1s report is the safety and environmental ef-
~ .,.t Cit 
fects of nuclear power p~~ts, by which is meant plants operated by 
\ utilities to supply elect ricity to their customers. Its purpose is to 
\. present factual information on a number of topics relating to this 
~ject. 
About 80 per cent of the electricity used in the United States 
is produced in steam-electric power plants. These are the plants in 
which heat from the combustion of coal, oil~ or natural gas (the fossil 
fuels) converts water to steam. The steam is then used to drive a tur-
bine generator and thereby produce electric power. 
The nuclear pow.e~ plant is a new kind of steam-electric plant 
in which the heat comes not from the burning of a fossil fuel, but f rom 
the fission of an atomic fuel, the basic source of which is uranium. 
The turbine-generator part of a nuclear power plant is similar to that 
of an ordinary steam-electric plant; and the product, electricity, is 
- ~ 
. ..._ 
identical. · 
There are two principal incentives for developing and using 
nuclear power. First, it promises to reduce the cost of generating 
electricity in sections of the country that are distant from coal mines 
or oil or gas fields and therefore bear high fuel transportation costs. 
Examples are the Northea t and the West coast where fuel costs typically 
-··· r 
account for about hal .~ ~he total cost of power generation. Nuclear 
4 
power 1s already benefiting these sections by making a competitive en-
ergy source acceptable to them. 
The second reason is that nuclear power promises ultimately t o 
. / 
be an indispensable energy source, nation-wide. While United States 
reserves of fossil fuels (especially coal) are large, our rate of con-
Sl..Dllption is increasing rapidly. This is true not just in electrical 
power generators, which presently account for about one-fifth of our 
fuel consumption, but also in transportation, manufacturing, heating, 
and other activities in which fuel is consumed in large quanti t i es. 
Altogether, it has been estimated that we will use as much ener gy· from 
fuel over the next twenty years as we used from the American Revol ution 
to the present day. When projected increases in the rate of energy 
consumption are taken into account, the indications are that we would 
deplete our fossil fuel resources in only two or three generations if 
' we were to continue our present pattern of fuel utilization. In 1972 , 
we used 30 per cent more fossil fuel than what was produced f or power 
I 
generation (60 billion barrels) (American Broadcasting, 1973). The use 
of nuclear fuels for generating electric power will help conserve fos-
sil fuels and will greatly extend our energy resources for the future. 
Nuclear Power Today 
United States development of nuclear power began ill 19 54, when 
the Congress passed legislation permitting utilities and others besides 
2 
the Federal Government to own nuclear reactors (Lish, 1972). 
Since 1954, a total of about 19 million kilowatts of atomic 
power capacity has been placed into operation; plants with an additional 
51 million kilowatts of capacity are in an advanced state of construe-
5 
tion and an additional 86 million kilowatts of capacity are now being 
designed. These numbers are small in relation to the total amount of 
United States electric generating capacity, which is currently almost 
four hundred -nlillion kilowatts. They, nonetheless, represent a signi-
ficant amount of power.t Figure 1 locates nuclear power plants in the 
United States today. The total capital investment made or committed to 
·--. 
date by United States utilities for nuclear power operation facilities 
has reached and gone over the one billion dollar mark. 
Jacksonville, Florida, has been chosen as the site. for a new 
$200 million manufacturing facility which will build platform mounted 
nuclear power plants on an assembly line ~as is. These plants will be 
capable of withstanding salt water exposure and the force of the ocean 
for the life of the plant. The plants will be rated at 2,000 megawatts 
~ 
of output and weigh 140,000 tons (Florida, 1972). The environmental ef-
; 
fects from floating nuclear power plants would be greatly ;reduced as 
compared to conventional o~hore plants. 
LEGEND 
Operable (34) -------------- II 
Bei ng Built (57) ----------- ~ 
Pla~Ded (Reactors ordered) - It 
(81) 
Figure 1. ~ucl~r £ower Reactor s 
.A 
.( 
I 
\ 
- \ \ 
in the United Stgtes 
\ 
I 
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' ~ 
(Supplied by Atomic Energy Commission, June 30, 1973) 
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SAFE'IY 
f 
Safety and Radiation 
ii 
It. should be ~der\tood at the ~eginning that it 1s physically 
--
impossible for a nuclear power plant to behave like an atomic bomb. In 
the latter, pieces of ~ss~ntia~ly pure fissionable ·material are rapidly 
. ·t 
compressed into a dens~ mass which is forcibly held together for an in-
stant of time to ~nable 1thE! chain J;"eaction to spread through it. These 
conditions do not and cannot exist in the reactors us~d in nuclear power 
plants. They use rel~tively dilute fuel; ~they are designed .along dif-
ferent principles; and they operate differently. 
The safe~ of nuclear power plants does not depend on res train-
1ng the force of nuclear energy but on containing the radioactive rna-
terial it generates. 
The fission process requires a particular kind of heavy element , 
such as uranium or plutonium, as a basic material. Natural uranium i s 
a mixture of three isotopes, atomic forms that are chemically alike but 
vary in mass. .An atom of one of these isotopes, uranium-Z·JS ;· oon read-
. 
ily undergo fission when a free neutron strikes its heavy central nu-
cleus. The nucleus breaks into two pieces that fly apart at high speed; 
in addition, two or three new neutrons are released. The kinetic energy 
of the flying fission fragments is converted to heat when they collide 
with surrounding atoms, and the new released neutrons cause a chain re-
action by initiating new fissions in other uranium-235 atoms. 
Th · · 1 d · t · t · 1 generated are the "ashes '' ~ pr1nc1pa ra 1oac 1ve rna . er1a~s 
8 
of fission - the so-called fission products . . A reactor generating 1 
rnilliori kilowatts of electrical power for one year will produce 1200 
kilograms of fission products, which one day after. shutdown has an ac-
. . (_)). 
tivity equal ·to some three billion curies (Moeller, 1969). The products 
are a diverse mixture of substances. Some of the radioactive fission 
products that are produced are radioactive iodine-131, radioactive 
strontium-90, strontium-89, radioactive cesium-137, and radioactive 
krypton-85 (Simps1tn, 1972). Some are gases, some are solids. Some 
have short radioactive half-lives, same have long half-lives, and some 
are stable (non-radioactive). The quantity of fission products formed 
is small in terms of man - only a few pormds a day in a big plant - but 
large in terms of radioactivity. As the plant operates, the reactor ' s 
inventory of radioactive fission products builds up gradually rmtil a 
point is reached at which the rate they lose radioactivi ty jus t about 
offsets the ~ at which they are formed and then it essentially level s 
. 
off. All but a verj small amount (less than one-thousandth of one per 
cent) of the material normally remains confined within the fuels . 
Small additional arnormts of radioactive matter, called activa-
tion products, are formed in a nuclear power plant by exposure t o neu-
trons (LisR, 1972). This only happens in and around the r eactor core, 
which is the only part of the reactor where many neutrons are present. 
Mbst activation products have very short half-lives and are of minor 
importance in relation to fission products. 
The basic rmit for expressing amounts of radioactivi ty is the 
cur1e. One curie of radioactivity is equal to a certain very large 
number (37 million) of atomic desintegrati ons per second. This rela-
tionship has little absolute meaning when appli ed to a mixture of radio-
9 
active substances such as fission products. The reason is that different 
kinds and strengths of radiation are given off by diff~rent radioactive 
materials. For example, one kind (alpha particles) is blocked by an 
ordinary piece -of writing paper, while another kind (gamma rays) can 
penetrate several feet of concrete.~ 
' t 
Radiation Detection and Measurement 
-
A very important aspect of radioactivity is. its detection and 
·~ 
measurement. The presence of atomic radiation (tmdetectable by htnnan 
senses) is readily detected by several types of instruments. One of 
the simplest radiation detectors is ordinary photographic film, which 
darkens on exposure to radiation. It is used in the form of film badges 
as a means of measuring the cumulative amounts of exposure received 
during a given period by employees in nuclear power plants (Lish, 1972). 
Other types of detectors such as geiger counters are us,ed to detect the 
presence and measure the intensity of atomic radiation. 
Radiation detection is also very sensitive in another way - it's 
able to identify specific radioactive substances. This is made possible 
by the fact that every type of radioactive atom has a characteristic 
pattern or radioactivity. 
Those who operate nuclear power plants ca,n, through the use of 
radiation detection and measurement instruments, maintain an extremely 
close check at all times, not only on radiation levels in and around 
the plant but also on the identity and amount of any fission products 
present in plant effluents. 
r Radiation Safety Standards . 
( The. problem of balancing risks against benefits in nuclear power 
10 
plants takes the fonn of radiation safety standards.· 
The standards which govern acceptable practice in at.omic power 
plants are detennined by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as part of 
its statutory· ·responsibility tmder Federal law. In setting those stan-
dards, the Atomic Energy Commission receives official guidance from the 
Federal Radiation Counci~ (FRi.} whose reconrrnendatiollS are subject to 
the approval of the President and whose membership includes the Secre-
taries of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Defense, 
Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and the "chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Connnission. Also, the AEC has the assistance of the National Connni t tee 
on Radiation Protection and Measurements, . and of several advisory com-
mittees which the AEC has established. 
~e Federal Radiation Council has recommended that whole body 
radiation exposure of members of the general public not exceed 500 mil li-
rems per year. The millirem (~usamiths-of-a-rem) is a standard 
measurement that takes into account the properties of the kinds of ra-
diation involved.] The AEC' s radiation safety standards are des igned 
accordingly. The AEC' s basic radiation safety standards are published 
in the Code of Federal Regulations and are, in fact, laws . 
Other numerical guidelines are that nuclear power plants must 
be designed to limit radioactivity in effluents to levels that would 
keep resultant radiation exposures of persons living-)lear the plants 
to less than 5 per cent of the average natural bac grDun~ radiation 
(Nuclear Power, 1972). Natural background radiation comes f rom natural -
ly radioactive substances. These substances a~e present . in common place 
materials, such as granite, and also in the human body . Part of the 
potassium and carbon in the body, for example, is radi oactive. The 
11 
average exposure from natural background radiation in -the United States 
ranges from 100 to 125 millirems per year. Thus, the 5 per cent level 
would be about one per cent of the federal radiation protection guide-
lines of 500--m±llirems per year. 
I 
-
-· i 
1 
·-
-: -. 
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CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DURING OPERATION 
- .. -
The Reactor Core 
A large water-cooled reactor contains SO to 100 tons of fuel . 
The fuel material most commonly used today is slightly enriched uranium 
dioxide (U02) in the form of small cylindrical pellets . The heat f rom 
fissioning a pound of U-235 (l ess than one per cent of whole uranium) 
is large, with the ultimate thermal potential of 1. 4 thousand tons of 
coal or 6,000 barrels of oil (Garney, 1972). The pel l et s are placed 
in thin-walled metal tubes to form fuel rods , a number of which are 
bundled together i n a long met al can to make up an assembly known as 
a fuel element. A number of these are positi oned in a pre-determined 
grid to make up what is known as the reactor core . The core is con-
. 
tained in a massively construct ed steel tank, known as the reactor 
vessel, through which cooling water flows (Lish, 1972). 
The supply of fi ssi on product s in the plant, after several months 
of operation, amounts to sever al hundred pounds. The fission products 
are, of course, found inside the fuel. On a weight basis, in excess of 
99.99 per cent of the fissi on product supply of the plant normally re-
mains confined within the fuel elements . . It is difficult for the fis-
sion products to leave t he fuel. There are two reasons for this fact. 
First and most i mportant, it i s the nature of uranium dioxide to hold 
onto the fission products. Second, fission products which manage to 
break loose f rom the uranium dioxide must find a way to get past the 
fuel cladding (the metal tubes) in order to get out. Those that do get 
13 
out of the fuel enter the ·coolant. 
When the time comes to refuel the plant, which 1s done annually, 
the reactor is shut down and the top of the reactor vessel is removed. 
A crane is us-ect-·to lift out the spent fuel elements and move them to a 
storage vault or pool. There they are left for several months to allow 
for the shorter-lived radioactivity to subside. By the end of this 
-
cooling off period, nearly all of the gaseous fission products have 
lost their radioactivity. The fuel elements are then loaded into rug-
gedly built lead-shielded steel containers for shipment by truck, rail 
or barge, to a plant where they will be chemically processed to recover 
their unused fuel content for future use. It is at the processing plant 
that the fission products contained in the fuel elements are removed, 
concentrated an~ stored, except krypton-85 which is released as a gas 
to the atmosphere. 
The Coolant System 
There are two basic types of water-cooled reactors - pressurized 
water reactors (A~) and boiling water reactors . CB1~) (Forman, 1970). 
In the former, the reactor cooling water or primary coolant is kept 
under sufficient pressure to keep it from boiling in the reactor vessel. 
On leaving the reactor vessel it passes through a steam generator in 
which it gives up its heat to a separate stream of water or secondary 
coolant, thereby cqnverting the latter to steam; then it flows back to 
its reactor (see Figure 2). 
In a boiling water reactor the flow pattern is different. In 
this case, the reactor cooling water is allowed to boil in the reactor 
vessel so that the steam is generated in the r eactor (Gofman, 1971). 
Additional steam may be generated in a separate heat exchange similar 
-· .. -· ~ - . 
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to that in a pressurized water plant. This steam goes to the turbine, 
is condensed, and the condensate is returned to the reactor vessel. 
It is important to llllderstand that in both systems the primary 
' . 
coolant circulates within a closed equipment circuit and is completely 
cut, off from its original source, such as a river, lake, or ocean. In 
fact, in all commercial nuclear power plants, the ?~Y water that goes 
from a waterway into the plant and then empties back directly into the 
waterway is that which is used to cool the turbine condensers. This 
water does not flow through the reactor. Its sole purpose is to carry 
non-usable heat away from tl!e plant. 
~~ the power plant operates, the reactor cooling water picks 
up some radioactivity. One source is leakage of some fission products 
through minute imperfections in the fuel element cladding. These fis-
sion products, amollllting to something like one-thousandths of one per 
cent of the fission product supply of the plant, are prin~ipally the 
gaseous and more eaSily vaporized solid parts of the fission-produced 
mixture. Another source of radioactivity in the reactor cooling water 
is activation products. These include activation products formed in 
the water, most of which have a very short half-life (an example would 
be radioactive nitrogen which has a half-life of only a few seconds) 
(Lish, 1972) and activation products. These are folllld in reactor struc-
tural materials and enter the coolant through corrosion or erosion. 
To maintain the purity of the water and to limit the amount of 
radioactivity in the primary cooling system, the reactor coolant is 
purified. This is done by draining off a portion o£ the primary cool-
ant flow, passing it through purification equipment, and then return-
Lng it to the system (Gofman, 1971). 
16 
Radioactive Waste Handling at the Plant Site 
In addition to processing a portion of the primary coolant flow, 
the coolant purification system may also handle water collected from 
other points ·m· the reactor system (for example, water that has leaked 
out, of equipment, or that has been used to clean out equipment during 
maintenance operation). The purification is done by means of evapora-
tion, demineralizers and filters. 
All but a small fraction of the solid or liquid radioactive 
substances removed during the purification process are collected as 
waste concentrates, which are then stored. The balance, averaging a 
few millionths of a gram per day during rputine operation, is discharged 
to the waten.,ray serving the plant in a dilute waste stream in amorn1ts 
which meet the AEC standards for drinking '·ater. Further dilution oc-
curs as the waste stream is mixed in the waten.,ray. 
The radioactive gases removed during the purification process 
average a few hrn1dred thousandths of a gram per day during routine 
operation. This material is released to the atmosphere through a tall 
chimney on a controlled basis to assure that there is sufficient dilu-
tion and atmospheric dispersion of the radioactivity to meet AEC regu-
lations which are based on an annual radiation exposure that might be 
' 
. . 
received by persons living at and around the plant site. 
The radioactive waste concentrates from the purification process, 
toget~er with other miscellaneous solid wastes are encased in concrete 
and steel barrels. When a sufficient ntnnber of barrels accwnulate, 
they are shipped from the plant to an AEC approved site for burial or 
long-term storage. 
17 
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~ . -· lliE CLEAR ACC IDENf,.s 
a reactor_ can opera~e safely is limited 
I 
by the capacity of its cooling system in other words, the rate at 
which the primary coolant can carry away the heat generated in the re -
actor core. If the heat were to be generated at a faster rate than i t 
1s carried away by the coolant, the fuel would overheat and could melt 
or even vaporize. The consequences might. range from heavy radioactive 
contamination of the coolant (through the release of fission products 
from another fuel) to damage to the reactor equipment and some release 
of radioactivity from the primary reactor system into the plant con-
tainment system. o:. J 
Therefore , one type of accident that 1s taken into cons i deration 
during design is that of nuclear excursion - an accidental increase in 
the rate of fission chain reaction. This also would cause high t ern-
peratures to be reached in the fuel and cause chemical r eactions be-
tween reactor material that would increase the amount of energy involved. 
Natural Safe~ards 
Nuclear reactors tend to slow therhselves down when nuclear ex-
cursions occur. Several factors contribut e t o thi s characteristic. The 
most important factor is called t he "Doppler effect" (Forman , 1970) . 
This is a complex phenomenon. 'When the t emperature of the fuel rises , 
the proportion of neutrons captured by non-fissioning atoms increases 
and the rate of fission t ends to slow down . The "Doppler effect" is 
not only automatic but instantaneous, and offers immediate resist~ce 
to any increase in reactor power level. 
18 
A second factor is that as the fuel becomes hotter, its density 
decreases slightly, which also acts to lower its reactivity. 
Thirdly, in water-cooled reactors, the water . that flows through 
the reactor case, besides carrying away the heat, serves also to mod-
--
erate the neutrons and encourages the fission chain reaction. Just as 
the fuel density decreases, with increasing temperature, so does the 
density of the .water which again lowers the reactivity. 
In normal operation, the temperature of the fuel cladding 1s 
kept well below its melting point (Lish, ~972). Then the fuel tempera-
ture can rise and fall during an excursion without affecting the make-
up of the fuel elements. 
Design Safeguards 
To understand how reactors are controlled, it 1s necessary t o 
explain what is known as "excess reactivity." To start a reactor and 
maintain normal operation, more fuel than is required for a fission 
chain reaction must be added to the reac·tor. This extra fuel furnishes 
excess reactivity against which the system can draw to sustain the chain 
reaction as the reactor operates. 
For normal operation, there must be a means of compensating for 
the excess reactivity that 1s present in the reactor core. In other 
words, there must be a way of controlling the rate at which the excess 
fuel is consumed. This is done by adding "negative reactivity" in the 
fonn of substance that absorb neutrons. By moving these · substances into 
and out of the reactor core with adjustable control rods, the amount of 
neutrons in the core can be decreased or increased, thereby slmving down 
19 
or speeding up the reaction . . 
Reactors controlled in this way are equipped with a number of 
control rods, some of which are used only for emergency shutdown of 
the reactor. ·'In many reactors , solutions containing _neytron absor:bers, 
such as borax, are added to the primary coolant, either for routine 
control or for use during shutdown (Lish, 1972). All reactors are 
--
equipped with instrumentation to monitor the amount of neutrons in the 
reactor core. This instrumentation is what controls the adjustment of 
the control rods in the reactor. In emergency situations where the 
core is overloaded with neutrons, the contro.l rods can be lowered into 
the reactor quickly thereby shutting down. the reactor. 
Similarly, other instruments monitor other aspects of there-
actor operation, such as the level of coolant in the reactor vessel, 
the temperature of the coolant leaving the reactor vessel, and the pres-
sure of the primary reactor system. All these instruments can trigger 
. 
a rapid shutdown of the reactor. If a power failure should occur, mech-
anical devices will take over and insert the control rods into the re-
actor core. Yet another safeguard takes the form of emergency stand-
by desiel generators. The Florida Power Corporation nuclear plant at 
Crystal River has two such units . 
Failure of Cooling System 
Overheating of the fuel could also be caused by an interruption 
~ the flow of coolant through the reactor core when the reactor is 
operating in a normal manner. Also, once the fuel has been in service 
in a reactor it continues to give off heat when the reactor is shut 
down and even after it has been removed from the reactor. Tnis results 
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from the radioactivity of the fission products and, while not nearly as 
intense as the heat that is generated during reactor operation, it 
could lead to melting of the fuel ~lements if cool.ing were not provided 
(Gofman, 1971}-. _:._: nstnnnents monitor the coolant system and in · cases 
of either minor leaks or of out-right loss of coolant, the reactor is 
automatically shut down. Also, a standby coolant system is provided 
to cool the reactor core during reactor shutdown in the case of loss 
of coola'n0 r-. '-' ~ 7 o 1 b'II'T' <'V-' . 
____ ____., . 
Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) are intended to cool a 
reactor's extremely hot core in the event that it loses its normal 
coolant through a ruptured pipe, a broken weld, or a key valve opened 
in error. c---E.xpe.~t-5-Gal-1 this type of accident "the maximum e:redible ac-
cident" that a reactor can possibly sustain (Gillette, May 1972). 
prived of the cooling water, a reactor's core temperature would qui ckly 
rise to the melting point of the fuel element metals~ Wi~in an hour 
a large reactor core could melt and drop to the floor of the reactor 
vessel. 
·~Experts say that a loss of neutron modeiating water would pre-
vent a nuclear excursion from occurring, but residual heat in the core -
plus heat released by decaying fission products in the fuel and by 
violent chemical reaction between metal and remaining water - could 
still amollllt to 50 megawatts of energy. This would he -rror-e than enough 
t~~allow the core to melt through the steel reactor vessel, and to carry 
it through tons of concrete and steel below, within another hour or so. 
Beyond this point, the molten core could 3ust keep goin~(Gillette, May 
1971) . 
Experiments are being conducted as part of the preliminary work 
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leading up to research wi~ the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility in 
Area, Idaho, a $35 million domelike structure in which the AEC will 
progressively starve a 55 megawatt .reactor of coollng water and mea-
sute-·fts behavior (Gillette, September 1972). The LOFT project started 
in +963 at a projected cost of $18 million. The WFT experiments, 
which are scheduled to begin in 1975, will provide the first test of 
. --
an emergency core cooling system under actual operating conditions. 
(By 1975, 80 nuclear plants could have used the results of these ex-
periments.) The model is designed to lose its cooling system and melt 
revealing what would actually happen in the worst type of accident. 
The facility is now 80% complete and by no means ready to be used. With 
the costs running toward the $35 million mark, allowing the unit to 
destroy itself is beginning to create many skeptics within the atomic 
energy field. 
I 
Another project in Idaho 1s the Power Burst Facility (PBF) 
(Gillette, September 1972). It was completed in the summer of 1972. 
Completion was four years late with 100% overruns at a cost of $8 mil-
lion. Its purpose is to subject nuclear fuel facilities to abnormal 
stress conditions and to observe fuel rods before and after an accident. 
There are conflicts of opinions on all sides as to overruns, delays, ob-
jectives and goals of these two projects. 
One experiment has shqwn (using ~ small scale model) that when 
loss of coolant occurs, high steam pressures within the reactor vessel 
actually restrain all but about 10% of the emergency cooling water from 
entering the vessel (Gillette, May 1971). · 
Another experiment showed that temperatures of some of the fuel 
elements may go higher as a result of loss of coolant than had previously 
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been expected. This is a matter of concern because the higher a fuel 
element's temperature rises, the more likely it is ~0 rupture, spilling 
intensely radioactive fission products into the reactor vessel. MOre-
over -~ -the higher temperature of the fuel rods, which are typically clad 
in ~irconitm1 alloy, would intensify a chemical reaction between the 
metal and the cooling water. This would release hydrogen, generate 
still more heat, and thus place an even heavier demand on the emergency 
cooling system. 
Accidental Criticality 
Accidental criticality refers to the possibility of a fission 
chain reaction starting by accident (Gofman, 1971). A chain reaction 
could start in an amount of fuel considerably less than a full reactor 
load. The answer to this type of accident i s "safe geometry," which 
means ensuring that a critical mass cannot be assembled under any cir-
CtmlStances. The safeguards include designing shipping containers so 
that it is physically impossible to load an unsafe number of fuel ele-
ments ·into them, and equipping fuel s~orage vaults with spacer devices 
so that safe geometry is assured. 
Vapor Containment 
Vapor containment 1s the final safeguard against radioactive 
substances escaping from the plant to th~ environment (Fonnan, 1970). 
The basic concept of vapor containment is that it will endure 
the maximum credible accident. This type of accident would have to oc-
cur through multiple failures, such as the sudden and complete loss of 
the primary coolant, the failure of the emergency cooling system to 
operate and· the overheating and melting of the fuel elements. Thus, 
the vapor containment shell would have to withstand the extreme pres-
sures and all of the radioactive substances that would be released. 
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There are two types of vapor containment sys t ems used today in 
nucrear power plants using water-cooled reactor~. 
One type makes use of a large spheri cal or cylindrical steel 
shell that encloses the entire reactor. The shell, which in a large 
--
plant might be the height of a twenty story building, is constructed 
by welding together sections of steel plate . In plants that are lo·-
cated at a distance from population centers , a single containment shell 
is used. -For plants that are located near or in population. centers, 
more elaborate r equirements are used. For example, metropdli t an Chicago 
has, as of las t year , five nuclear power plants in operation, two under 
construction and six on order (American Broadcasting, 1973) . Shells 
for these plants ar e double-walled, have zero leakage features, and 
are surrounded by a thick concrete radiation shield. A ~jor accident 
' 
within this type of a shell would have essentially no effect on the 
surrounding envi ronment. 
A second type of containment system is known as the "pressure 
suppression system ." In this sys tem, the reactor vessel is located in 
a steel containment tank surrounded by a concrete radiation shield . 
The containment tank (the dry well) i s connected by pipes to a second 
tank (the wet wel l) that is partially fi l l ed with 'ater. The entire 
unit is housed below ground level wi thin a special! constructed build-
ing. In the event of an accident within the reactor, the vapor would 
pass into the dry well and from t here through pipes ~to the wet well. 
The pressure surge would be relieved b the a or condensation. 
The nuclear power plant at Crystal r uses the first type of 
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containment shell or vessel. It is made up of a one inch thick steel 
inner liner surrounded by a three fee~ thick reinforced concrete shell. 
The vessel's fotmdation is a 27 feet thick reinforced concrete mat. 
Before-operation, the pressure in the vessel is ·raised t o 67 pounds per 
square inch and held at that test pressure for twelve hours. The ves-
sel is approximately 200 feet tall and 180 feet in diameter. 
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RADIOACTIVE AND 11-IERMA.L WASTES 
Nuclear power generation creates problems unique unto itself. 
Figure 3 shows the course radioactive substances follow from mining 
--
through disposal. 
Refining and reprocessing of reactor fuels to obtain fissionable 
components results in the production of several by-products. Most of 
these isotopes have short half-lives and decay to a safe level in less 
than a year. Temporary storage is therefore feasible as a means of 
averting environmental contamination. However, elements such as stron-
tium-90, cesium-137, and plutonium are also present. These have half-
lives of ·lumdreds or thousands of years, and constitute a prolonged ra-
diation hazard (Radioactive Wastes, 1972). 
By the year ·zooo, according to present projections, storage will 
have to be provided for about 27,000 megacuries of radioactive wastes in 
the United States; these wastes will be generating 100,000 kilowatts of 
heat at that time. 
The wastes will include about 400 megacuries of alpha emitters~ 
Of these, the plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,000 years will be 
dangerous for about 200,000 years. 
Chemical Reprocessing Plant 
At the chemical fuel reprocessing plant, the fuel elements, 
which have confined the radioactive materials, are d1ssolved and pro-
cessed. Mbst of the radioactive materials are retained iri underground 
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Figure 3-. Path of Jhdio.:1cthc Substances fro lining through Disposal 
(Gofman , 1971) 
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tanks at the processing site, but three volatile radionuclides - i odine-
131, krypton-85, and tritiliDl - may be discharged to the atmosphere. The 
iodine-131 is substantiaily reduced by storing the ' fuel elements before 
processing. In 100 days, radioactive decay wi ll r educe t he iodine-131 
content by a factor of 5000 and various waste gas cleaning techniques 
are then utilized to minimize its discharge into the atmosphere. At 
present, krypton-85 is discharged to the atmosphere, and most of the 
tritium is discharged to the environment as water. 
Only one commerci al plant, the Nuclear Services Plant at West 
Valley, New York, is currently operating and this only since 1966. 
During this time , liquid discharges have imposed an average dose of 
7 5 millicuries per year at the bolllldary. Essentially no iodine- 131 has 
been emitted. As for the other main gaseous effluents, all the krypton-
85 ~d hydrogen- 3 contained in the fuel has been released. 
Another report listed the releases of this plant to be 14 curies 
of ·strontium-9 0 in waste water and one million curies of krypton- 85 
vented to the atmosphere (Gi llette, June 1971) . These f i gures are be-
low the permi tted rel eases but far exceed the worst case among nuclear 
power plant emissions. 
Technol ogy is now availabl e for reducing liquid discharges, and 
processes for r et aining krypton- 85 and hydrogen-3 are being developed 
at AEC laboratori es. Proper ly oper ating radi ochemical plants in the 
future should emit no mor e radioactivi ty than do properly operating re-
actors - that is , less than 10 per cent of the natural background ra-
diation at the plant bmmdary . 
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Confinement 
Long life isotopes can be separated from other nuclear waste 
components, concentrated, and confined to prevent release of radiation. 
For -example, law level wastes are stored in steel-lined concrete con-
tainers and stored 20 feet below the surface.
1 
The containers deteriorate 
slowly and the components decay to safe radioactive levels by the time 
--
that significant leakage occurs. 
High level wastes are being stored undergroood as liquids in 
steel-lined concrete vaults. Such storage has not yet been found to 
result in release of radioactivity beyond the immediate area. However, 
leaks have been detected in tanks, so increases in ground water could 
cause widespread contamination. Research is being conducted.on cal-
cinatmg wastes to granular form or evaporating solutions to produce 
crystals for storage. 
Transport 
It 1s projected that by the year 2000 there should be 106 mega-
watts of nuclear power available, of which two-thirds will be liquid 
metal fast breeders. From this one can expect 7000 to 12000 annual ship-
ments of spent fuel from reactors to chemical plants, with an average 
of 60 to 100 loaded containers in transit at all times. Projected ship-
ments might contain 1.5 tons of core fuel which has decayed for about 
30 days, in which case each shipment would generate 300 kilowatts of 
thermal pmver and 75 megacuries of radioactivity (Weinberg, 1972). 
Today, a container might contain only 7 megacuries and produce 30 kilo-
watts. 
Design of a completely reliable shipping container is complex. 
As now conceived, the heat would be transferred to air by liquid metal 
29 
or molten salt; and the container would be provided with rugged shields 
which would resist defonnation that might be caused by a train wreck. 
To be acceptable the shipping containers must be shown to withstand a 
30 minute fire and a drop from 30 feet onto an linyielding surface. 
Storage 
Other techniques have been proposed to handle the large volumes 
of radiocative wastes expected in the future . Separated wastes in 
stainless steel containers may be placed in c~verns excavated in deep 
metamorphic bedrock. Tunnels which receive waste containers can then 
be capped, and fractures or fissures in the rock sealed by grouting. 
The containers would eventually disintegrate. Hmo~e er, leakage would 
be slow since the hydraulic gradient of bedrock is lm , l astes have 
higher density than surrounding ground water, and components such as 
plutonium are only slightly soluble. The primary disadvantage is the 
excavation costs. 
Vulcanization 
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory has proposed that reactor wastes 
be vulcanized or incorporated into molten silicate rock. Liquid wastes 
could be injected into a cavern, blasted at a depth of 2000 ft. with 
nuclear bombs. The liquids would self-boil and evaporate to solids. If 
the chimneys are capped, the solids would melt and dissolve into the 
surrounding rock. ·This eventually freezes and traps the wastes in a 
solid matrix (Radioactive Wastes, 1972). 
Salt Hines 
The main advantages of bedded salt are primarily that, because 
salt dissolves in water, the existence of a stratum of bedded salt is 
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evidence that the salt has not been in contact with circulating water 
during geologic time. This is reinforced by the fact that salt has 
been found to be the best material available beca~e of its seismic 
stabil1ty, compressive strength, ability to conduct heat, high 'melting 
poi~t (1450°F), self-sealing ability and shielding p~operty which 1s 
similar to that of concrete (Holden, 1971) . 
Containers of hot solidified high l evel wastes, which range m 
size up to 18 feet long and 2 feet in diamete~are transported t o the 
salt mines in railroad cars. They are then lowered down shafts into 
large rooms that have been carved out of a salt strata. The pressure 
of the salt, and the heat of the cylinders ranging from 600°F to 900°F, 
will cause the natural plastic action of the salt, which has . the con-
sistency of very hard wax-, to seal around the containers. Within a 
period of months to 10 years the s teel covered ceramic containers will 
disintegrate leaving the salt to hold the wastes in place. 
Heat Discharge 
In the most efficient fossil fuel thermal power plant, about 
40 per cent of the generated heat is turned into power. Most of the 
remaining 60 per cent is .transferred to cooling water in the turbine 
condensers. For nuclear power plants about 70 per cent of this heat 
release finds its way to the cooling water. The heat discharged and 
wasted from the crystal River 800 megawatt nuclear unit is sufficient 
• to increase by 1S°F a 200 feet wide , 10 feet deep discharge canal f l ow-
measures. Both wet and dry cool ing towers are used and there is no heat 
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discharge whatever into surrounding bodies of water. · . 
The most obvious objection to the tower concept 1s its cost, 
both capital costs and the increased plant operatiTI.g costs it. imposes. 
An even strange~ _o~jection is its appearance. Large dual towers might 
only be suitable for industrial parks or rural areas. Another objec-
tion to cooling towers is fog, near airports; for example, a vapor 
plume rising several hundred feet above a tower is not desirable. Also 
freezing vapor may create icing conditions in the surrounding area . 
Cooling towers also generate large quantities of steam in a cold eli -
.. mate which .is objectionc;ilile to neighboring coimllUili ties. 
Off-stream cooling ponds are one ~lternative for plants of 
limited water supply. The greatest problem is the availability and 
cost of land, which may run into several million dollars - 1 ,000 to 
2,000 acres per 1,000 megawatts depending on the economics of t he plant. 
Dilution is another possibility for keeping down ~he water 
' 
teffiperature in a large water supply. A t)rpical installation is the 
Oyster Circle Nuclear Plant of the Jersey Central Power and Li ght Com~ 
pany on Barnegal Bay , New Jersey. Circulating water f lows t o the con-
densers of the 640 megawatt Unit #1 at 460,000 gpm ; an additional 
780,000 gpm 1s not pumped through the condensers but goes di r ectly from 
the intake to the discharge canal , forced by t hree low-head axial-flow 
pumps (Richards, 1968). 
Suitable dispersion of t he warm water discharge 1s usuall y a 
minimum requirement for keeping t otal water temperature \vithin an ac-
ceptable limit. Near Richland, Washington, a c:onduit , 1~ feet in di-
ameter flowing at more t han 13 fps, carries 564 ,000 gpm 1000 feet ~o 
mid-channel of the Columbi a River where it is discharged through four 
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vaned outlets. This discharge serves the 860 megawatt Hanford Nuclear 
Generating Plant of the Washington Public Power Supply System (Richards, 
1968). 
Another effective method of· dispersing heated water is.to dis-
charge it at the surface with a horizontal velocity of 2 to 5 fps. 
The momentum of this jet if properly direct~d will carry the heated 
water several thousand feet into the waterway, almost as effectively 
as a closed conduit. 
It is practical to consider combinations of two or more means 
of r~ducing a problem of heated water. For example, the discharge can 
be passed through a limited area cooling pond or a cooling tower be-
fore returning it tp the original river source. Of importan.ce also is 
fish mortality at the intake screens. In some seasons, several tons 
of fish per day have accumulated on intake screens due to high intake 
water velocities and brought plant operation to a halt. ' Other environ-
. 
mental factors include destruction of fish spawning areas during and 
after the construction of water handling facilities and the alteration 
of wildlife refuge areas by excavating cooling water canals and ponds. 
A point that should be made is that thermal effects from power 
generation plants do not necessarily cause thermal pollution in cooling 
waters. In many cases, heated water discharges do not strain the eco-
system of a given river or cooling lake. In cases where proper plant 
thermal inputs may cause harm to a particular ecosystem, supplementary 
cooling equipment can be used. 
New technologies will permit increase thermal efficiency of 
nuclear power plants and at the same time begin to put to use the low-
grade waste . heat that is now dissipated into the air and water. A 
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population of 450,000 could enjoy year-round comfort· conditioning with 
a ~000 megawatt nuclear plant providing electricity, heating and air 
conditioning (Simpson, 1972). To provide air conditioning in this man-
ner, supplement~l_ J'l~at from the turbine cycle would be used to power 
a li thium-bormide air conditioning system .. 
. Other possible uses of waste heat include secondary sewage 
treatment and agricultural applications to speed up or extend growing 
seasons. 
Cost and Environmental Factors 
The cost of protecting the environment must be factored in pro-
jections of future costs of electric prn~er. During the 1960's, the 
electric utility industry accounted for an average of 14 per cent of 
all air pollutants discharged into the air. But the industry also 
purchased approximately 90 per cent of all the air pollution control 
equipment sold in the United States, spen~ing beuveen 1967 and 1971, 
about $1.6 billion on both air and wat~r pollution control equipment 
(Simpson, 1972). Many more billions of dollars will have to be spent 
between now and 1975 to meet the tough nffi~ EPA regulations for air pol-
lution discharges. 
The increase in investment costs caused by pollution control 
regulations for fossil-fired plants in 1976 will be 7 per cent for 
gas, 26 per cent for oil, and 23 per cent ·for coal plants. Nuclear 
plants costs will be 5 per cent higher. 
Base investment costs of a coal plant will rlse from $110/kw of 
capacity in 1965 to $241/bv in 1975 because of .inflation~ Nuclear plant 
costs will almost double, ris ing from $155/kw to $ 306/~, . But when 
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the costs of environmental protection are added, coal costs r1se to 
$297/kw and nuclear to $321/kw in 1975. Environmental protection costs 
change the spread between nuclear fuel and cost from $65/kw to $24/kw 
in 1975 (SimpsonJ _1.912). The lower cost of nuclear fuel more than off-
sets the capital costs differential between coal and nuclear. 
---
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LICENSING AND REGULATION 
No one may build a nuclear power plant without rece1vmg a con-
struct~on pennit and then an operating license from the United States 
---
Atomic Energy Commission . 
. The Atomic Energy Commission is an independent agency of the 
Federal Government headed by a five member commission appointed by the 
President (Forman, 1970). 
To obtain a construction permit from the AEC, the applicant must 
submit his technical experience and financial responsibility. One of 
the requirements within the financial area is that the applicant must 
have a specified amount of insurance coverage against possible public 
liability. A typical new plant will carry about $600 rriillion in insur-
ance (Garvey, 1972).· Figure 4 illustrates the time and reports required 
by the AEC of the Florida Power Corporation in order to construct and 
operate the nuclear power plant at Crystal River. 
The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is required by 
the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to assess the poten-
tial environmental impact of any proposed nuclear power plant before 
issuing the applicant a construction permit for the plant (New Guidelines, 
1972). In addition a more thorough assessment is made after construc-
tion is begun but before the operating license is issued. In each case 
the applicant is required to submit to the AEC an environmental report. 
In general, it contains (1) the environmental impact of the proposed 
action, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided, 
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Figure 4. Flow Diagram of Licensing Procedure for the Nuclear Power Plant at Crystal River, Florida 
(Supplied by Mr. H. L. Bennett, Director of Generation Construction, Florida Power Corpora- ~ 
tion, Crrstal River, Florida) ~ 
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should the proposal be implemented, (3) alternatives to the proposed 
action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and (5) ~y_irreversible and irretrievable commitments 'of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be im-
plemented (Wilson, 1973). 
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1HE SAFElY RECORD 
Even though nuclear power generation is quite young in the United 
States, the amount of electricity that has been produced 1s already 1n 
the billions of kilowatt-hours. 
During this time there has been no instance of radiation injury 
. 
to any worker in nuclear power plants. The radiation exposure to the 
envirorunent has been far below that allowed by the AEC regulations. The 
oldest plant in the country which has been in operation for 12 years has 
had no excessive release of radiation (American Broadcasting, 1973). 
There has been no instance of an accident of the type discussed earlier 
m this report. 
The startup operation may extend over several mon~s to a year 
or longer. Extensive check out procedures are instituted during this 
period. The plant is started at a very low level and then is increased 
to the full rated power of the plant. During this period the reactor 
usually experiences many automatic shut downs due to over sensitive con-
trol instruments or minor component failures. 
In normal operation one factor is becoming quite important in 
r elating nuclear power plants to that of fossil-fuel electric plants. 
The factor is that in nuclear plants the ·components that get the hardest 
wear are the reactor fuel elements. These elements are replaced when 
the plant is refueled at from one to two year periods.. In fossil fuel 
.plants the components that get the hardest \vear are the tubes in the 
furnace section of the steam boiler, \vhich of course are permanent type 
components. In time, these tubes present the most ser1ous operation 
and maintenance problems of this type plant. 
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Recently, the AEC released a new all incornpassing .safety report 
which included d~~cussion of regulatory processes, design of nuclear 
power plants, safety precautions, etc. The report stated the probability 
of a critical accident of any given nuclear power plant in any given 
year is one in a 1000. TI1e AEC also projects approximately 1000 nuclear 
power plants operating by the year 20 00 . This then implies that there 
could be at least one accident per year. They state that an accident 
of this type would release no more than 10 curies of biologically harm-
ful radioactive iodine, an amount asserte9. harmless to the surroilllding 
population. They list the probability of the steel pressure vessel fail-
ing as one in a million (Gillette, January 1973). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The nuclear power plant of 1973 1s a relatively inefficient way 
of gen~rating electric power; its thermal efficiency is only about 32% 
and it d?es not utilize the fuel energy potential of uranium fuel. But 
in the .context of the 1975 Envirorunental Protection. Agency requirement, 
it is clearly head and shoulders above the fossil fuels because of its 
minimal effects on the environment. 
The indus try is now taking steps to provide for the very rapid 
and continuing growth of electric power and energy requirements and to 
do this in a manner that will pr ovide acceptable environmental impact 
to the maximum extent for which the public is willing to pay the cost. 
The need for power product ion is urgent and obvio~. Planning 
. 
or -construction delays are unfortunate. An awareness and understanding 
of each party's problems and considerations 1are essential to construe-
-
tive efforts to provide the necessary electrical power without destroy-
ing the world around us . 
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